This study provides insight into how two national arts organisations located in London manage their performance in the pursuit of heterogeneous objectives, within the confines of external influences. These organisations significantly rely on the government for funding and are therefore required to implement policy initiatives, albeit at arm's length from the government. Performance management systems (PMSs) were primarily designed to enable trustees discharge their statutory duties of collecting, preserving, and displaying objects and works of arts, which were reflected in a management agreement containing the government's strategic priorities. The findings show that the changing politico-economic climate has subtly started to change values, accountability relationships and realities in the field of arts and culture. Whilst arts organisations emphasised socio-cultural objectives in strategic planning and operational processes, external pressures arising from austerity has subtly started to displace socio-cultural values. Business language, vocabularies, and tools commonly used in the private sector are insidiously taking roots in arts organisations. Austerity provided a signal to executives that the survival of their core activities was at stake and, they have to engage in income generating activities to support their core activities.
is, the modelling, systematic measuring and testing of correlations and causality among performance variables by the inclusion of control variables, similar to controlled observations and experimentations carried out in the natural sciences, may not be appropriate in settings where they are complex influences, uncertainties and uncontrollable variables that are difficult to quantify. Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 263 ) developed an extended PMS by elaborating on and adding to the performance perspectives in Otley's (1999) to provide "a research tool for describing the structure and operation of performance management systems (PMSs) in a more holistic manner". However, Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 267 ) acknowledge that they have not included external contextual factors, which they view "as contingent variables that might explain why certain patterns of control are more or less effective, rather than characteristics of the control system that need to be incorporated into a description. " Neely, Adams, and Kennerley (2002) provide complementary insights into the role of external influence. They suggest that organisations are more likely to prosper and survive in the long term if they adopt a stakeholder centred approach when designing PMSs. They propose a comprehensive and integrated performance management prism that requires managers to think about stakeholders' expectations (who are the stakeholders and what do they want and need?), and stakeholders' contributions' (what does the organisation want and need from its stakeholders?).
Core dimensions of performance (i.e. mission and vision, structure, critical success factors, strategic planning and implementation, performance measurement and evaluation, and consequences) are of primary concern to members working within the organisation's boundary (Otley, 1999 ) -See figure 1. The vision statement is expected to succinctly and inspirationally clarify where an organisation wants to be in the future, whilst the mission statement is expected to explain why and for what purposes an organisation exists and how it intends to progress towards achieving its vision. Critical success factors are the activities that an organisation is expected to carry out and are the pre-requisites for progressing towards the achievement of organisational vision (De Vasconcellos, Sousa, & Hambrick, 1989) . Information flows from internal and external sources form the basis for performance evaluation. The information flows may lead to change in strategic objectives and directions, depending on whether they are being used as single loop learning (i.e. treating objectives and strategies as fixed or given) or double loop learning (i.e. changing objectives and strategies in response to internal and external stimulus). Ferreira and Otley (2009) included the dimensions of PMS use and change, and coherence and intensity of relationships to provide a second level of analysis, because they pervade across the core performance dimensions at the centre of the diagram. The interactive use of PMS to discuss strategic and operational issues and the diagnostic use of PMS to trouble-shoot problems may lead to fine-tuning, refinements and changes of the core performance dimensions (Simons, 1995) . Figure 1 adds external influences that are relevant for understanding performance management of arts organisations (Ellwood & Greenwood, 2016; Jeacle & Miller, 2016; Oakes & Oakes, 2016; Oakes , et al., 1998; ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016; Townley, et al., 2003) . The purpose of this skeletal framework (Laughlin, 1995) is to illustrate the interests that are embedded in PMSs of arts organisations when pursuing politico-economic and socio-cultural objectives. As Oakes , et al. (1998, p. 277) found, the conception of PMS as "mere acts of technical transcription concealed the force this process involved" in directing "attention away from the shifting of cultural capital toward economic capital and the diminution of existing identities". The autonomy of an organisation to pursue strategic actions, and its ability to define boundaries within a particular field depend on the economic, social, and cultural capitals that it possesses (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) . Kaplan and Norton (2001) ; Neely, et al. (2002) Prior critical accounting studies have provided insights into the influences that drive sociocultural and politico-economic objectives of arts organisations (Ellwood & Greenwood, 2016; Zan, Blackstock, Cerutti, & Mayer, 2000) and highlighted the "challenges in managing the arts, in particular the delicate balancing of the possible tensions between creativity and economic constraint" (Jeacle & Miller, 2016, p. 1) . In the context of arts organisations in Alberta, Oakes , et al. (1998, p. 258) consider the discourses of "power as central to understanding how control works in modern society and organizations". These authors argue that organisational planning and control systems provide sanctions to legitimise influential discourses (of managers and their external constituents), and serve as a mechanism for producing pedagogical knowledge and understanding of an organisation and its activities.
The adoption of private sector calculative practices in the arts sector may have real consequences, beyond the phenomena being measured or valued (Hines, 1988) because the act of adoption has the potential to significantly influence core values and identities (Oakes , et al., 1998) . Whilst accounting technologies provide the conceptual tools for decision making (such as recognising the economic reality of a transaction, an activity or an asset), they only paint a partial picture that matters for a particular purpose and from a particular perspective e.g. decision usefulness for investors, in contrast to accountability for future generations. For example, Oakes and Oakes (2016) found that the lifeworld of arts organisations which were mainly funded by Arts Council England was partly corrupted by accounting and commercial values. Managers were apparently aware of the inadequacy of numbers in capturing the full value of arts but nevertheless "played out the charade of advocacy and legitimacy, claiming to demonstrate impact when they knew the essence of the arts is always out of reach" (p. 50). They call for future studies to "develop further understanding of the management of austerity and funding constraints in arts organisations" (p. 50). Ellwood and Greenwood (2016) examined the challenges and consequences of the attempt by government and accounting standard setters to pressure arts organisations to recognise the economic value of their heritage assets. Arts organisations resisted pressures to place economic values on their collections because the determination of economic value is fraught with ambiguities, the measurement and preservation of economic value may result in the disposal of historically and culturally significant collections, and recognition of assets paints a picture of affluence which may affect funding from potential donors.
In contrast, Mikes and Morhart (2017, p. 67) argued that accounting can play a catalysing role by "transforming a niche cultural project into a commercially viable popular culture product, while enhancing -rather than violating -the project's artistic authenticity." In the context of the Netherlands, ter Bogt and Tillema (2016) found that accounting fostered trust between theatres and the municipalities and mediated the tensions between conflicting creativity and control objectives. They "show that, despite the formal picture set out in performance agreements and accounting documents, the control relationship between theatres and municipalities might appear to be very 'loose' and informal in practice." (p. 6). They argue that trust and relational controls play an important role in complementing formal accounting controls in relationships, especially when organisations are faced with multiple objectives and when performance is difficult to define and measure.
The next section explains how data has been collected and analysed for the purpose of this study.
Research methods
This study draws on interviews conducted with participants involved in the PMS of a national museum and a national arts gallery located in London, and on information that are in the public domain.
Prior to conducting interviews, we analysed documents from secondary sources to engage in informed and meaningful discussion with the interviewees. More specifically, we analysed Acts of Parliament and management agreements, because PMSs are expected to enable trustees and museum directors discharge their statutory duties and deliver on the government's priorities specified in these documents (Oakes , et al., 1998) . We also analysed the strategic plans, annual reports, key performance indicators, and minutes of meetings to understand how trustees and executives respond to external influences. When analysing these documents, we paid particular attention to issues pertaining to: socio-cultural and politicoeconomic themes and priorities, governance structures, and accountability relationships. We also visited the museum and arts gallery prior to conducting the interviews to understand the socio-cultural activities they undertake, collections they have on display, and commercial and non-commercial facilities they provide to visitors.
A total of twenty-one face-to-face interviews were conducted with trustees and executive directors who had substantial experience and knowledge of performance management issues and challenges facing the arts sector. These individuals were passionate about the world of arts and cultural policies, and played an important role in balancing sociocultural imperatives and politico-economic constraints (Oakes & Oakes, 2016; ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016) . Sixteen interviews were conducted with trustees and executive directors from the two arts organisations -the contact details of these interviewees were available in the minutes of meetings of the arts organisations which are publicly available on their webpages. Five interviews were conducted with directors from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) and non-government sponsors -the contact details of these interviewees were provided by the trustees and executive directors of the arts organisations who regularly interacted with them.
The core dimensions of performance, challenges posed by austerity, and responses to pressures were discursively apprehended during the interviews which were semi-structured in nature (Townley, et al., 2003) . The following questions were asked guide the interviews: What are the objectives of your organisation? What are the roles of the trustees and executives and how do they interface with relevant interest groups? How is performance managed? By who, through what processes, and what areas are particularly emphasised? How effective are performance management processes and measures in terms of achieving objectives? What constraints, pressures and challenges does your organisation face, and how does it respond to them?
To enable candid replies, interviewees were informed that their names would not be disclosed when writing the findings, but were cautioned that the name of the organisation may be identifiable as this study also uses information in their annual reports and strategic plans which are in the public domain. They were also informed they could withdraw from the interview process at any time and, make any comment off the record. All interviewees consented in writing to participate in the study, verbally consented to be recorded, and did not express concern that the name of their organisation may be identified. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The recordings were immediately transcribed by one of the researchers after the interviews to enable accurate recall of issues discussed (Miles & Huberman, 1994) . The transcripts were also checked for accuracy by another researcher.
All the transcripts were read and analysed in relation to themes that have been highlighted in the performance management literature, discourses in policy and regulatory documents, corporate plans and annual reports, to identify pertinent and contentious issues and to frame this study's findings. This process requires reflexivity and acknowledgement of the researchers' own interests (e.g. arising from the choice of a particular paradigm or theoretical framework) and position they occupy in the intellectual field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Said, 1994 ) -i.e. in the communication of a particular reality, we may be complicit in constructing that reality (Hines, 1988) . The objective of this study is not to generalise, but to provide insights into performance management issues and challenges faced by the two arts organisations studied which may resonate with experiences in other settings (Berry & Otley, 2004) .
Findings: The performance management of arts organisations
The findings are presented in relation to the inter-related dimensions of performance discussed in the literature. External influences are discussed first, as these drive performance management processes within arts organisations.
External structural influences driving organisational objectives
Both the museum and the arts gallery are well established organisations -they were officially opened in the mid and late nineteenth century respectively. Their governance structure, within which they pursue their socio-cultural and politico-economic objectives, is quite complex. Although they are organised as non-departmental public body (NDPB) to enable their executives carry out activities at arm's length from the government, they contribute towards the performance objectives of DCMS in return for the public funding they receive. They are also exempt charities under Schedule 3 of the Charities Act 2011, meaning that the DCMS is their principal regulator for charity law purposes. This regulatory framework partly drives the mission, objectives and activities, as stated in the annual report of the museum: "During 2016-17 the Board of Trustees of the Science Museum (the SMG Board) agreed a new vision and mission for SMG…which takes due regard of the Charity Commission's general guidance on public benefit and informs all decision-making, future planning and strategic priorities" (National Audit Office, 2017, p. 5).
The statutory duties of the trustees are specified in the National Heritage Act 1983 and the Museums and Galleries Act 1992, which state that they are responsible to: (a) care for, preserve and add to the works of arts in their collection; (b) secure the works of arts exhibited to the public; (c) make the works of arts and documents available to persons seeking to inspect them in connection with study or research; and (d) generally promote the public's enjoyment and understanding of arts. The trustees are also politically accountable to the ministers (from DCMS and the Cabinet Office) who are responsible for appointing them on the board of national museums and arts galleries, although "the recruitment of Trustees takes place in accordance with the procedures defined by DCMS and the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments" (National Audit Office, 2017, p. 41). The government controls the criteria for making senior appointments, such as the desirability of candidates possessing specialised knowledge about arts, culture, history and collections, and commercial knowledge about fundraising, and income generation, and thus indirectly plays a role in embedding values at the strategic level in arts organisations.
The arts organisations engaged in fundraising and commercial activities to supplement their funding from government and charitable sources, which may create conflict among objectives. Table 1 shows their funding structure in 2007 and 2017, and highlights the impact of the government's austerity agenda that began in 2010. Although government funding for the museum has increased in nominal terms from £37m to £41, a director of finance from the museum explained that this has declined in real terms and that the rate of increase in their unavoidable costs, which are mostly fixed, was greater than the rate of inflation: Source: Annual reports (2007 and 2017).
The proportion of non-government funding as a percentage of total funding in 2007 to 2017 has increased for both arts organisations, which can potentially change accountability relationships because reliance on funding is a source of influence (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016) . It is interesting to note that interviewees from the arts gallery pointed out that they wanted greater control of the funds they raised from other sources -the total funding for the arts gallery was about 65%, as compared to the museum which was 41% in 2017. However, a principal curator from the museum highlighted that placing greater reliance on nongovernment funding may influence the values of arts organisations: Whilst austerity has pressured arts organisations to raise income from non-government sources, the financial crisis has taken its toll on non-government funding. This has led to stiff competition among arts organisations from a declining pool of funding. As commented by a deputy CEO from the arts gallery:
Winning donations from benefactors is an uphill struggle, even for the most adept of fundraisers. Charitable donations to arts and culture were down by about 20 per cent last year.
In summary, PMSs are expected to enable arts organisations discharge their statutory duties and meet the accountability expectations of their funders and themselves.
Vision, mission, organisation, and critical success factors Arts organisations operate within the confines of statutory, government and economic influences. The vision and mission reflected their core values which were primarily geared towards the pursuit of socio-cultural objectives. For example, both organisations articulated their vision and mission in their annual reports and corporate plans as follows: 'building a scientifically literate society', 'inspire next generations of scientists, inventors and engineers', and 'promote through the medium of portraits the appreciation and understanding of the men and women who have made and are making British history and culture'. Whilst interviewees were generally enthusiastic to talk about the socio-cultural objectives of their organisation, they highlighted that the pursuit of these objectives were influenced by resources and administrative constraints imposed by their funders. The mission and vision, which featured in official documents such as annual reports and strategic plans, played a pedagogic role in communicating the values of senior management (Oakes , et al., 1998) . They were aimed at enabling trustees discharge their statutory responsibilities, and enabling the museum director discharge her/his 'personal accountability' to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sports (i.e. the minister in charge of DCMS) for safeguarding public funds. A director of development from the museum explained the accountability structure as follows: In return for the funding provided by DCMS, the chair of the board of trustee and museum director were required to sign a management agreement with the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. The Secretary of State explicitly highlighted her financial priorities for the arts organisation by stating that it should 'continue to pursue commercial and philanthropic approaches to generating revenue which will complement grant-in aid' but couched her socio-cultural priorities in broad terms by stating that it should 'ensure that free entry to the permanent collections would be made available', and 'protect world-class collections and front-line services' (DCMS, 2017a) .
Whilst the government's socio-cultural priorities were loosely specified in the management agreement (i.e. one page), administrative matters were quite comprehensively covered (i.e. 30 pages). Financial and administrative matters relating to governance and performance that were covered in greater depth include: financial management, duties to deliver on the strategic priorities of DCMS, broad performance objectives of the arts organisation in relation to statues and the implementation of public policies, risk management and internal control procedures, procurement, accounting information to be disclosed and reported to DCMS, formal review meetings with DCMS, and responsibilities of the parties to the agreement.
As compared to the formal relationship between arts organisations and the government, the relationship with non-government funders depended on the size of the funding and purpose for which funding was provided. The agreement ranged "from a strong legal contract with major corporate donors, to a purely verbal philanthropic agreement with trusts and foundations" (Director, arts gallery). When undertaking projects, museum and the arts gallery met their non-government funders' socio-cultural priorities whilst simultaneously fulfilling their duties to DCMS. Project-specific success factors were identified for subsequent monitoring and evaluation. As stated by the director of development from the museum:
You have to set up project objectives for the project and meet sponsors' priorities, but you have to meet the government's priorities as well. Sponsors monitor the project quite closely; you will need to meet them very regularly. You would have to demonstrate that you have used the fund to meet objectives, and to evaluate achievement of objectives afterwards.
In summary, the core values in the vision and mission of arts organisation, which provide the framework for strategic planning and reporting to relevant authorities, reflect the statutory duties of senior management.
Strategic planning and implementation
The long-term strategic and short-term business plans played a pedagogic role in terms of providing departments, teams and individuals with a planning and control tool that would subsequently be used to assess their contributions to organisational objectives (Oakes , et al., 1998) . In this respect, the chairman of board of trustees and the museum director stated that the strategic planning "document captures the top-level long-term priorities and is to be used actively as a touchstone for decision-making throughout the next decade or so" (Museum, 2017, p. 38) .
Arts organisations distinguished between 'core' and 'support' values to differentiate the values that mattered most to them. Whilst both organisations placed significant emphasis on their socio-cultural objectives (e.g. inspire people, create knowledge, increase audience and sustain growth of collections) which they termed 'core' priorities, they also acknowledged the importance of 'support' priorities such as the generation of income. In response to funding pressures, the museum stated that by 2030 "it will be an exemplar among museums for commercial activity and entrepreneurship" (Museum, 2017, p. 36) .
The interviewees generally identified themselves with the socio-cultural values espoused in the management agreement, and in the strategic plans. However, they also acknowledged the importance of income generating activities in supporting core values, such as introducing special paid exhibits, new products or service, and trading in coffee and gift shops. For example, a director of public engagement from the museum broadly highlighted these values as follows:
Our strategic plan reflects the history of the museum what we choose to focus and how we want to position the museum in the next ten years, how we want to be perceived by our stakeholders, the funding environment, and the needs of the stakeholders who provide us with funding in particular, but all these things are very much related. Fundamentally the strategic plan is a bold statement about who we are, why we matter, what we intend to do, but it is written with a view to securing funding for the organisation because we need to raise money to do what we want to do.
The different components of the strategic plan were 'owned' by directors and their heads of departments, denoting segregation of duties and responsibilities in the pursuit of different, but related, objectives. For example, the curators were concerned with issues related to collections, whilst the directors of engagement were concerned with the profile of audience, and the commercial task force was interested in income generating activities. As explained by a director of public engagement from the art gallery: In contrast to the strategic plan which spanned a decade and articulated the board of trustees' and the museum director's strategic priorities, the arts organisations prepared an annual business plan to articulate the operational activities that departmental managers and individuals intend to undertake in the pursuit of long term objectives. Surprisingly, a chief curator used the cause-effect vocabulary in the balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 2001) as follows: "Every individual has a performance development plan, where personal objectives are informed by the departmental objectives and linked to the museum's business plan for the next twelve months".
DCMS did not interfere with operational matters which were the responsibility of the executives. However, it was involved in making senior appointments and dealing with administrative and strategic matters through a 'bureaucratic chain'. There was an element of trust between DCMS and the arts organisations (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016), as apprehended from our interview with a director of development from the museum:
To a large extent, DCMS just let us get on with our work. However, it would be naïve to think that DCMS does not indirectly influence operational activities. This is because the long-term strategic plan of the chairman of the board of trustees and the museum director which informs the operational matters in the annual business plans is itself based on the management agreement which focusses on the strategic priorities of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sports. As stated by the chairman and museum director in the strategic plan "the priorities and goals in Inspiring Futures will be reflected in Annual Plans from 2017/18, which will set out specific actions and deliverables…This overarching strategic framework will also inform the subject-specific strategies and plans that are produced from time to time." (Museum, 2017, p. 38) .
In summary, the management agreement, strategic framework, and business plans have penetrated the departmental boundaries of arts organisations to shape values of the different teams working to pursue common objectives. These documents contain private sector performance management vocabularies which have entrenched arts organisations.
Performance measurement, evaluation and consequences
Performance was evaluated externally in relation to the management agreement signed by the board of trustees, the museum director and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sports, and internally in relation to the annual plan and the strategic plan.
The external monitoring process is aimed at enabling DCMS discharge its parliamentary accountability for using taxpayers' money. DCMS provides official statistics of the arts organisations they sponsor and delegate the responsibility of compiling performance indicators to the chairman of the board of trustees and museum director who are required to follow the DCMS's 'Performance Indicator Guidance Document' (DCMS, 2017b). However, a director of engagement from a museum argued that they should not be judged on the basis of generic KPIs:
The KPIs are simplistic and don't reflect our strengths as a scientific research institute -we have many scientists who produce scientific knowledge as compared to other museums who don't. We are different, yet we are judged on the basis of generic KPIs, alongside others.
However, the external KPIs were used symbolically to loosely manage performance. No targets were assigned and there were no financial consequences: The management agreement does not say: 'we will give you x if you achieve y in terms of performance' (Deputy CEO, arts gallery).
The feedback loop from DCMS to the arts organisations was weak. As pointed out by a director of public engagement from the arts gallery:
We sign the management agreement with DCMS at the beginning of every four years, telling us what the grant-in aid is going to be and what KPIs we must report on, but the document don't ever get referred to again…The information just literally goes into a black hole and nobody sees it again.
Some interviewees commented that lack of feedback was the result of downsizing of the museum team in DCMS which affected its ability to effectively engage with the arts organisations. As pointed out by a trustee: 'DCMS itself was not spared from the funding cuts'. The UK government has reduced the number of key performance indicators (KPIs) from 12 to 3 (i.e. visitor numbers, philanthropic income, and items on loans) to reduce the administrative burden of data collection and analysis (DCMS, 2017b) , and in response to the widespread criticisms of the use of performance targets in the arts sector "which can act as millstones around the neck of creativity" (McMaster, 2008, p. 4) .
Unsurprisingly, interviewees highlighted that their internal KPIs were more helpful than DCMS's generic KPIs. A director from the museum provided the following examples of qualitative issues they monitor using internal KPIs: "visitor satisfaction, number and quality of our publications, number of publications in top ranked journals, self-generated income, and number of scientist visiting and using our collection for research purposes". However, he admitted that other factors such as "what visitors take away from the museum, in terms of understanding and inspiration to become scientist" are difficult to capture. A bottom-up approach was followed when designing these KPIs i.e. they were discursively agreed by the departmental directors and their teams, tailored to capture heterogeneous objectives and critical success areas, and used diagnostically as traffic lights to signal progress towards achieving strategic objectives (Simons, 1995 DCMS loosely monitored the performance of arts organisations at a distance, whilst tightly specifying the ground rules that arts organisations should follow to demonstrate value for money. Internal performance evaluation processes were praised for their emancipatory potential of enabling discrete organisational units evaluate the effectiveness of their activities when pursuing heterogeneous objectives.
Discussion and conclusion
This study has provided insights into the complex influences that shape the PMSs of national arts organisations. PMSs were primarily designed to enable trustees discharge their statutory duties of collecting, preserving, and displaying objects and works of arts, which were reflected in the management agreement containing the government's strategic priorities, such as fostering interest in science, technology engineering and mathematics (STEM), creating cohesion among the population and reaching specific groups such as ethnic minorities, women and young people (DCMS, 2017a) . PMSs of arts organisations were also influenced by changes in political and economic climate, and reflected the efforts of trustees and executives at interpreting and responding to these changes in their strategic plans and operational activities.
Dependence on funding is a major source of influence (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016) . In return for public funding, arts organisations are required to contribute to the strategic priorities of the Secretary of State of Culture, Media and Sports. The latter is politically accountable to the Cabinet Office and the Parliament for obtaining value for money in the pursuit of policy objectives. In line with the NPM ideology of distancing politicians from service delivery to make managers accountable for results (Hood, 1995) , national arts organisations are organised as NDPBs to provide them with immunity from political interference. However, the government was able to obtain action at arm's length through two main governance technologies which were hierarchical in nature: control over the appointment of trustees and museum directors, and the management agreement. DCMS was primarily concerned with financial reporting, policy priorities and administrative matters. Despite the financial and administrative focus aimed at increasing transparency, DCMS could not effectively assimilate the information produced by arts organisations and effectively engage with them because DCMS itself was not spared from the funding cuts. This lack of feedback unsurprisingly created the impression that the information was going into a blackhole. Nevertheless, DCMS intervened to over-ride an important strategic decision taken by the museum's executives to close one of its branches due to funding cuts and falling visitor numbers, because the political implication of the closure outweighed the financial implication.
The findings illustrate the power of governance technologies in transcending organisational and departmental boundaries to shape values and create identities through learning and reflection. Whilst accounting technologies, such as PMSs and strategic plans, are designed to communicate a reality by rendering things visible, they have the potential to create a reality of the things that are most valued by influential groups. For example, management agreement drove the long-term strategic and short-term business plans and made 'core' and 'support' strategic themes visible. These documents played a pedagogic role in creating knowledge to enable organisational steering and learning (Oakes , et al., 1998) . Heads of departments and individuals identified with the themes and objectives inscribed in strategic and business plans, and aligned their operational activities to pursue the strategic themes emphasised by senior management.
Generic KPIs have the tendency to standardise and homogenise. Whilst the appropriateness and usefulness of KPIs have been blanketly questioned in the literature (Oakes & Oakes, 2016) , this study distinguishes between generic and specific KPIs and highlights the purposes they serve. Generic KPIs, which were reduced from 12 to 3, were symbolically used to demonstrate contributions of arts organisations to DCMS's priorities, whilst providing autonomy to arts organisations to differentiate themselves. Generic KPIs were used because it is difficult to precisely define and measure the outputs and outcomes of different arts organisations by designing specific KPIs, which would have further hindered managerial discretion and increased administrative burdens. Interviewees devised their own specific KPIs to capture information of interest to them, but admitted that not all information can be captured by performance measures.
The implications of austerity should be carefully assessed by the government, because of its potential to change accountability structures, displace socio-cultural values, and change identities. Austerity and the government's funding cuts pressured arts organisations to find alternative sources of funding to support their core activities. Competition has intensified among arts organisations who are competing for the same pot of funding which has reduced. Interviewees highlighted that they are placing greater emphasis on fundraising and moving towards a US model of funding their activities through donations and commercial activities, although they are unable to charge for access to their general collections as part of the condition of the grant-in aid from DCMS. However, a significant increase in the proportion of non-government funding to total funding may require a reconfiguration of the current governance structure which prioritises accountability to the government.
External pressures arising from austerity resulted in the emphasising of politicoeconomic values and the subtle displacement of socio-cultural values, which may be counterproductive to the government's own policy initiatives of, for example, widening citizens' participation in the arts sector. The pursuit of market solutions to the problem of austerity may marginalise certain groups and change values, as arts organisations are tempted to attract visitors who are more likely to spend, put-up special exhibits for which visitors have to pay to gain access, use scarce space for commercial activities, and cut costs by reducing the number of engagement projects they undertake (Oakes & Oakes, 2016) . The focus on economic objectives (e.g. fundraising activities) may conflict with social-cultural objectives, in the deployment of scarce managerial time and space resources.
External politico-economic pressures arising from austerity and the financial crisis helped to inculcate new vocabularies to reconfigure identities. The language, vocabularies, and tools commonly used in the private sector (such as strategic and business plans containing mission, strategies, SMART goals, cause-effect relationships, profit, and income-generating activities) were insidiously taking root in the arts sector (Mikes & Morhart, 2017) . Reliance was placed on private sector "external experts who advised, guided and challenged" arts organisations in the preparation of strategic and business plans that provide the overarching framework for governing arts and culture (Museum, 2017, p. 5) . This strategic document, prepared by financial expert, created visibilities on strategic themes that formed the basis for operational action by executives and their teams. Austerity provided a signal to executives that they have to embrace these vocabularies to support their core activities, the survival of which were at stake.
The government's austerity discourse has brought changes that are subtly redefining the field of arts and culture. Arts organisations share some complicity in the process of changing their values by implementing externally imposed imperatives in the guise of austerity that may threaten the production of cultural goods. Managers were complicit in their own control, by accepting the government's austerity agenda and adopting PMS modelled on the private sector to change their practices, identities and what they value in the field of arts. Whilst funding is required to support the pursuit of socio-cultural objectives, arts organisations do not necessarily have to engage in fundraising and commercial activities, which may become a core activity and an end in themselves, to support arts and culture if these are truly public good.
